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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the emergence of region-owned local operators to counteract 
opportunistic behaviour of the incumbent on the market of regional rail services after 
competitive tendering failed in Poland. Six local operators have been set up so far, their 
combined market share is significant (54% in passengers, 44.5% in passenger-km) and 
growing. The prior flawed liberalisation of regional rail market in Poland resulted in 
substantial barriers to entry for external competitors and strong incentives for incumbent’s 
opportunistic behaviour toward regional authorities. Main reasons for regional authorities to 
vertically integrate are lowering transaction costs of providing rail public services and 
eliminating incumbent’s market power.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Contracting-out of public services in passenger regional rail transport in Europe has been 
examined by a growing body of literature. However, the previous papers have focused on the 
Western European evidence (e.g. Aleksandersson and Hultén 2007; Beck, 2011; Brenck and 
Peter 2007; Guihéry, 2014; Kain, 2007; Link, 2016; Nash and Smith, 2007; Preston, 2016; 
Thompson, 2007; Wegelin and Arx, 2016). Work showing the Eastern European experience 
with regional railways has been rare (Krol and Taczanowski, 2016; Taczanowski 2015; 
Taylor 2006; Tomeš and al., 2014). In particular, a closer examination of the Polish evidence 
in contracting of rail services has not been presented so far. 
 
This paper aims to fill this gap by showing unexpected results of regional railways reform in 
Poland, stemmed from regional authorities’ actions to mitigate their exposure to incumbent’s 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The infrastructure unbundling (2002) and the devolution of organizing (2001) and funding 
(2004) of railway services to regional authorities made competitive tendering theoretically 
possible in Poland. However, due to general lack of bidders, tenders became in practice sole 
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source negotiations with the sinking national incumbent PKP PR. The cooperation was hard-
going and became further complicated when the government decided to devolve the 
company to the regions (2008). 
 
The regional authorities were given the incumbent against their will and never started to treat 
it as an internal operator. Rather than keeping it afloat, the most prosperous regions have 
chosen to set up their own local operators to award them public service contracts directly. As 
a result, the Polish regional rail market has a unique structure: in 2015 the combined market 
share of six local operators was 54%, the market share of the national incumbent operator 
was 43.6%. Only the remaining 2.4% belonged to an external operator (Arriva) which was 
granted contracts via competitive tendering1. 
 
Section 2 provides the context and premises of Polish railway reforms. In Section 3 we 
discuss the main motives for failure of competitive tendering in Poland. The regional 
authorities’ relations with the national incumbent operator and the emergence of local public 
operators are covered in Section 4. Section 5 provides a discussion and conclusion. 
 
The methodology adopted in the paper can be referred to as a micro-institutional analysis. 
 
2. Context and premises of Polish railway reforms 
 
As in many other European countries, both post-communist and Western European, also in 
Poland railway reforms were driven mostly by persisting financial problems of an incumbent 
operator. The characteristic context of the initial period of the reforms were, however, 
dramatic patronage and coverage decreases in passenger services of Polish State Railways 
(PKP). Within only a decade after Poland started its transition towards market economy 
(1989), number of passengers fell by more than one-half (Fig. 1). PKP’s transport 
performance dropped even faster (Fig. 2). There were at least three factors behind this.  
 
Firstly, due to explosion in car owning in Poland, railway demand ceased to be relatively 
inelastic. Since PKP had been underfunded for years, the rolling stock was outdated and the 
infrastructure in bad condition. The poorly trained staff lacked customer-oriented culture. As 
passengers were not captive anymore to the public transport, inadequate standard of 
services started to play an important role. 
 
Secondly, when due to the dropping patronage PKP proposed to cut services, the 
government did not show the commitment to maintain the spatial coverage of rail transport in 
Poland. Just the opposite, the outflow of clientele was accompanied by severe cuts in 
government funding of passenger services. According to Taylor (2006), the rail subsidy fell 
radically in absolute terms, as well as a percentage of the state budget. 
 
Possible explanation of this unusual governmental policy towards railway is the nature of 
Polish post-communist transformation. Although very successful in terms of economic 
growth, it undermined the social costs of the process. As Szahaj states (2015), unlike other 
countries in the region, Poland initially chose the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism and 
                                               
1 Passengers (UTK, 2016). 
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interpreted it radically. Hence the desire to limit the role of the state and the belief in the 
market as an excellent mechanism for regulating not only economic but also social relations. 
 
 
Figure 1. Passengers transported by railways in Poland in 1990, 1995 and 2000-2016, 
millions (UTK, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 2. Transport performance of railways in Poland in 1990, 1995 and 2000-2016, 
billions of passenger-km (UTK, 2016) 
 
Reduced ticket sales combined with lack of government’s commitment to maintain operations 
inevitably led to massive railway closures to passenger services in order to cut losses. As 
most losses occurred in regional and local services, these were mainly affected. The length 
of the railway network used for passenger traffic decreased in Poland from 21,277 km in 
1988 to 13,818 km in 2003, that is by 35% (Komusiński, 2010). Consequences of closures 
have been dramatic for many inhabitants, socially deprived and excluded (Taylor, 2006). 
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Thirdly, the government was late with the reforms. It seems fair to state that the politicians 
did not have an idea of what the approach to rail transformation should be. For almost a 
decade the national operator was left alone, and thus railway remained one of the ancien 
regime islands on the map of the fast changing Polish economy. PKP become emblematic 
for bad management, waste of assets, disproportionate strength of labour unions and 
nepotism. As Taylor (2006) observed, the commitment of the rail industry itself to the 
implementations of the reforms was hampered by only employing people from within its own 
circles. 
 
The results of the delayed reforms not only led to the decreases in patronage and 
decapitalisation of PKP’s production assets. Perhaps, the most fundamental has been the 
final erosion of the traditional mission-oriented organisational culture of the company. This 
process started much earlier, as the economic crisis of the communist state (growing since 
the late 70s in Poland) had greatly affected the rail transport, also impinging on its 
professional value system and work ethos. However, when the overstaffed PKP was left 
alone during the transition, the immediate result was the fast pauperisation of railwaymen; 
since they had previously considered themselves part of a privileged profession, this led to 
their frustration, disheartenment, sometimes demoralisation. 
 
It seems that it has been a decisive circumstance that the traditional perspective of a public 
utility acting for public interest has evaporated. It happened before a new organisational 
customer-oriented culture could have emerged. We underline this circumstance as it seems 
to have played further an important role in the incumbent’s relations with the Polish regions. 
 
The first visible reforms occurred only with the Railway Transport Act of 1997. Although in 
theory they started the liberalisation of the sector, they were not motivated by a real intention 
to introduce competition. Their aim was to achieve a more commercial orientation of PKP by 
just a mere threat of new market entries. Plus, they formally implemented the Community 
acquis needed for Poland’s future accession to the EU. Very limited results of these reforms 
are summarised in the first column of Table A.1. 
 
The reforms took impetus in the new millennium. The financial crisis of railways arose and its 
operating losses became too high for the state to afford. The Act of 2000 on Restructuring 
PKP has been finally agreed with the railway unions. Divestiture, both vertical and horizontal, 
took place in 2001. The national incumbent PKP has been transformed into so-called PKP 
Group. Three new incumbent operators (PKP IC, PKP PR and PKP Cargo) have been 
formed out of the former passenger and freight divisions of PKP. The newly-created 
infrastructure manager PKP PLK published its first access charges list and network 
statement on 1 April 2002. This date is sometimes considered to be the truth beginning of rail 
liberalisation in Poland. 
 
With Poland’s entry into the EU near to happen (2004), the new Railway Act of 2003 was 
issued to achieve a regulatory framework consistent with the Community legislation. Among 
others, a regulatory body (UTK) was established. The effects of the alleged liberalisation 
policy in different time frames and market segments are summarised in Table A.1. In short, 
the reforms succeeded only in freight rail. 
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In regional railways, liberalisation remained on paper for the reasons that we examine in 
Section 3. Instead, Poland has seen the walking devolution in this sector of the economy. 
Regional authorities became obliged to plan and organise public rail transport in 2001. 
Starting 2004, the responsibility for financing it has been also shifted from the central 
government to the regions. The pinnacle of this policy has been an unexpected devolution of 
the incumbent to all sixteen regional authorities in 2008. Thus, compared to other European 
countries, “regionalisation” reached a very high degree in Poland. 
 
The opinion that the government’s crucial motivation behind this has been to get rid of the 
responsibility for the public regional transport in Poland may be exaggerated, but there is 
certainly a grain of truth in this: regionalisation was heavily underfinanced. The government 
rightly wanted the regional authorities to decide about what level of the supply of public 
services would be socially desirable on their territory, but did not care enough whether 
regions can afford what they had decided on, whether it can be delivered, and by whom. 
Instead, the government simply entrusted regional authorities to the promises of the 
competitive tendering while completely underestimating the commitment required to 
introduce such model of the provision of public services. 
 
The scepticism about the government’s motivation has been partly risen by the fact that the 
first legal basis for devolution was (until the Railway Act of 2003) the Act of 2000 
restructuring PKP. Hence the opinions that it was driven by financial crisis of the national 
operator. 
 
The compulsory competitive tendering formally came into effect in 2004, with a regulation 
implementing the Railway Act of 2003. Direct awarding only remained possible when “in 
house”. Tenders were single-stage, open or non-open, with sealed bids. The type of contract 
was the net-cost contract. Weighted criteria to select the winning bid could include committed 
reliability, frequency and standard of services, and some other options, but the most 
important was the amount of subsidy needed by a bidder. The maximum length of contract 
was 3 years (5 was possible in exceptional circumstances). 
 
The clear aim of the competitive tendering has been never formulated, but – as in many 
other countries on the early stage of experiences (Kain, 2007) – there were hopes for the 
future that competitive tendering would significantly reduce reliance on subsidies. In 
anticipation, in 2001-2003 – when the government was still responsible to fund regional 
public transport – the subsidies were much lower than agreed with regional authorities2. This 
heavily affected patronage (Fig 1. and Fig. 2) and almost killed the financial performance of 
the newly created incumbent on the regional market – PKP PR. 
 
Moreover – in marked contrast to PKP IC and PKP Cargo, intended to go public eventually – 
after breaking-up of the old PKP in 2001, PKP PR found itself the most overstaffed and with 
the most decapitalised rolling stock. The company was considered the sick man of the PKP 
Group, but the government kept postponing its reestablishment. It seems fair to state that it 
was left alone. Therefore, on the eve of the revolution in contracting-out of public rail services 
in Poland the incumbent was sinking. 
                                               
2 They amounted to 66.3%, 51.8% and 31.4% of the promised figures in 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively.  
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3. Failure of competitive tendering in Poland 
 
Successful competitive tenders largely depend on the organisers’ ability to attract a sufficient 
number of eligible participants. Public authorities in Poland have failed to achieve this with 
regard to regional passenger rail market. 
 
There is no information available about how many tenders have taken place since they were 
introduced in 2004. Given the number of regions in Poland, the length of a typical contract 
and the gradual increase in the use of direct awarding since 2008, we can conservatively 
assume that there have been no less than 50-60 of them. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, only about 10 tenders attracted the attention of potential newcomers (which 
requested the tendering documents) and in only three of them a would-be competitor 
decided eventually to make a bid. These three tenders were organised by Kujawy-Pomerania 
Region in 2007, 2010 and 2013 and won by Arriva against the incumbent3. However, in the 
vast majority of tenders there has been only one bid, made by the incumbent. 
 
This very modest interest in competition has been due to several barriers to entry that have 
combined and reinforced each other. Some of them have resulted from the clearly 
demonstrated government’s lack of commitment into regional passenger rail transport in 
Poland. We cover them separately for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, we don’t mean here the lack of commitment to set the barriers to entry low, but – 
quite the opposite – the lack of commitment that has resulted in setting them high. Secondly 
– in contrast to a more literal definition that a barrier to entry is anything that reduces entry – 
in this paper we take the Gilbert’s (1989) view that a barrier to entry is a rent that is derived 
from incumbency. And yet, uncertainty created by government’s lack of commitment also 
affected the incumbent, although – as we present in Subsection 3.1 – it had an adverse 
effect on this company. 
 
3.1 Government’s lack of commitment 
 
This uncertainty factor has been probably decisive for failure to attract serious international 
bidders, especially in the first years of tendering. Firstly, there have been many visible 
symptoms that the government may not be very interested in improving the functioning of 
regional railways in Poland. They included the postponement of the PKP PR restructuring, 
lack of financial commitment into subsidies and neglect of regulatory considerations. 
Secondly, the economic mechanism was triggered as follows. 
 
The degree of uncertainty was relatively high in Poland that was a new market and an 
emerging economy. With no visible commitment from the government, however, there was 
even more caution over the likely success of tendering in this country.  Especially 
devastating for the perceived risk was perhaps the fact that in 2001-2003, thus immediately 
before competitive tenders were introduced, the government’s subsidies for public service 
contracts dropped radically. Therefore, the view of the would-be bidders had to be that public 
                                               
3 Arriva bid for only part of the packages. The rest fell to the incumbent. 
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funding for passenger services still lacked sustainability in Poland. All in all, as the perceived 
risk was high, the potential newcomers needed high risk premiums. 
 
By contrast, the sinking incumbent was prepared to submit aggressive bids just to keep 
afloat for one or two more years. The government’s lack of commitment to restructure PKP 
PR resulted in creating an extremely strong incentive for this company to win any tender at 
any price with the aim of renegotiating contract in the future. Thus, incumbent and potential 
challengers were responsive to the uncertainty resulting from the government’s lack of 
commitment in two extremely different ways. 
 
The important issue here is that bids for public contracts in Poland have been typically 
evaluated on the basis of lowest cost. Other terms, including deliverability or standards of 
service, have been neglected or underestimated. This did not apply exclusively to the railway 
sector and on many occasions resulted in strategic bidding or winner’s curse phenomenon. 
 
The most notorious example is a contract with a Chinese company Covec to build a stretch 
of the motorway between Warsaw and the German border in 2009. Covec won after 
submitting an extremely low bid. Once the construction got under way the company quickly 
ran into financial difficulties, halted work and tried to renegotiate. Although the investment 
was crucial for EURO 2012 football championships co-hosted by Poland, the government 
rejected the attempt and cancelled the contract in 2011 to avoid strategic behaviour from 
construction firms in the future. 
 
In the railway sector, however, the government lacked the commitment that it showed in the 
Covec case. Moreover, the newcomers realised that strategic bidding has been made very 
hard to counteract by an organiser of tender. The most important weighted criterion to select 
the winning bid had to be an amount of subsidy needed by a bidder. The official information 
is scarce, but to the best of our knowledge the weight of this parameter has never been lower 
than 70%. What is even more important, in the light of the legal framework the organiser of 
tender could not estimate the deliverability of the contract. As long as the bid was formally 
acceptable, he only could take into consideration the committed terms of the offer. 
 
All in all, potential competitors who needed high-risk premiums to consider entry into the 
Polish market expected the incumbent to bid strategically, win against them and renegotiate 
the contract in the future. The threat of incumbent’s aggressive behaviour was probably 
enough to turn their eye away from this market. 
 
Using the terminology of McAfee and al. (2004), the government’s failure to commit has 
resulted in an ancillary barrier to entry. This one has combined with others (as shown in 
Subsection 3.2) to create a primary barrier or barriers to entry. 
 
Additional issues to cover in this subsection are also the costs and the risk associated with 
infrastructure access charges in Poland. Until recently access charges not only remained 
much higher than in most other EU countries, but also recurrently lacked stability. Partly it 
was due to the inadequate level of public infrastructure funding. Another important reason 
was the absence of any incentives for the PKP PLK infrastructure manager to lower its 
management costs. This included a complete lack of any regulatory pressure on the 
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upstream market. The regulatory body UTK has been politically controlled and lacked assets, 
tools and, most of all, independence to have any influence on the state-owned infrastructure 
manager. 
 
3.2 Barriers to entry 
 
The barriers to entry that we discuss in this subsection are the barriers reported by the 
potential entrants and by the organisers of tenders. Thus, they may be referred to as the 
alleged barriers to entry. 
 
The most commonly reported criticism has been that contracts in Poland are too short to 
allow the entrant to commit into the rolling stock. This trouble, pertaining to the investment 
horizon risk, has been experienced in many countries; e.g. according to Link (2016) a critique 
on too short contracts has occurred in Germany with much longer contracts (9.6 years long 
by average). 
 
As Thompson (2007) explains, the issue involves a disjunction between the long working life 
of assets and the shorter life of the contracts. This can be mitigated either by increasing the 
length of the contract or by transferring the risk of long-lived assets. The latter can be 
achieved by the rolling stock pooling or leasing, using the instruments like a guaranteed re-
purchase value of rolling stock at the end of the contract etc. 
 
The problem is in fact embedded in the risk of stranded assets at the end of the contract. 
Due to the low interoperability of the European rail system, rolling stock is not only a durable, 
but also a specialised asset. Second-hand markets for such products are limited and sunk 
costs problem arises. If there were no risk of stranded assets, the short length of contracts 
would not be an obstacle for investors. Therefore, assets specificity combined with 
uncertainty are a primary barrier to entry here. The short period of contract is not an 
economic barrier to entry per se. Perhaps, it can be referred to as an ancillary barrier to entry 
that reinforces the primary barrier. This is an important theoretical consideration with clear 
implications for economic policy. 
 
However, as the government did not commit to a sound economic policy towards the rail 
sector, the opportunities for rolling stock risk transfer were limited in Poland. Regional 
authorities lacked means and awareness to create solutions in this regard. They have been 
obliged by law to purchase rolling stock starting 2001, but typically these investments were 
scarce. Pooled ventures among the regional authorities have not emerged in Poland. 
Instead, unitary purchases led to proliferation in types, resulting in additional transaction 
costs of fleet management. 
 
Interestingly, organisers sometimes inscribed into terms of tender that bidder must have a 
rolling stock at disposal at the time the bid is submitted. This could result from a cosy 
relationship with the incumbent, but probably in some cases was due to lack of 
understanding how destructive it was to competition. 
 
As risk transfer was difficult, the would-be competitors lobbied for extending length of 
contracts. According to them, even 5 or 6 years was enough in some cases to commit into 
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rolling stock. The extension of the allowed maximum period took place only in 2010 and it 
has been 10 years since instead of the prior 3 years4. However, the duration of contract 
specified in a typical call for tenders has never been close to the upper limit. A typical 
situation was 1-2 years until 2010, then 3-5 years. Many regions performed tenders annually, 
for just one year. 
 
By lowering the specified length of a contract – thus elevating the ancillary antitrust barrier to 
entry – regional authorities reduced interest in competition to a minimum. Seemingly, such 
behaviour was irrational. The immediate consequence was that they could not expect any 
choice of operator. Instead, they forced themselves into a very uncomfortable cooperation 
with the incumbent which was clearly focused on exploiting them (as shown in Section 4). 
Thus, regions seemed to increase their uncertainty. 
 
In fact, it was probably a strategy to mitigate uncertainty in cooperation with opportunistically 
behaving incumbent. Barriers to entry were being set higher, but they had already been high 
before. Regional authorities did not expect nor have they experienced a real interest from 
other bidders. On the other hand, they were very reluctant towards longer contracts with the 
PKP PR, as they perceived contracts enforcing against the incumbent as unrealistic. 
 
Regional authorities recognised that their bargaining power is greater when negotiating new 
contracts than enforcing or re-negotiating the old ones. Therefore, they preferred to keep the 
incumbent on short contracts and to reset them periodically. In this way, regional authorities 
could consider announcing tenders for short-term contracts a rational choice of the lesser of 
two evils. The greater evil being a long-term contract with the incumbent. 
 
Another often reported hindrance for operators, thus the alleged barrier to entry, has been 
the incumbent’s advantage in terms of knowledge of market, revenues and other relevant 
information.  
 
Informational advantages are considered a potential barrier to entry in economic literature. 
What is more, it has long been recognised that they can play particularly important role in 
net-cost contracts, where demand information is crucial. Thompson (2007) points out that as 
public operator is using public funding there is no excuse for not requiring the information 
needed for potential bidders – including past demand and current cost. However, PKP PR 
refused to develop and share the information. And due to weak institutional framework, it was 
impossible for regional authorities to enforce it. 
 
Finally, the issues affecting timing of entry have been reported. Bidding, preparation and 
mobilisation times were very short, which partly resulted from short contracts duration. In 
case of annual contract, it was usually only few months. As there has been neither the staff 
nor the rolling stock transfer from the prior operator, it has been an important obstacle. 
 
All in all, there have been many alleged barriers to entry in Poland. At least some of them 
can be considered ancillary barriers to entry that combine and reinforce each other to create 
a primary barrier to entry. E.g. uncertainty, reinforced by a threat of strategic behaviour 
                                               
4 15 years has been allowed in direct awarding. 
 Page 10 of 17 
(covered in Subsection 3.1), can combine with asset specificity to produce a substantial 
primary barrier to entry. 
 
Tenders in Kujawy-Pomerania were successful because several circumstances happened 
simultaneously. Firstly, the authorities of the region were committed and aware how to 
design tender. They decided e.g. for packages of services and offered transfer of 
infrastructure charges risk from the operator. Secondly, as they contracted relatively small 
number of train-km, they had relatively important amount of rolling stock at disposal which 
they made available to a winner. Thirdly, in the first two tenders (2007 for 3 years and 2010 
for 10 years) the newcomer bid exclusively for non-electrified lines’ packages, where 
specificity of assets plays less important role as a risk and timing factor. In the third tender a 
developed trusting relationship with regional authorities played probably important role for the 
newcomer to bid for relatively short contracts (2013 for two years) on electrified lines. 
 
Authorities of Kujawy-Pomerania managed to remove barriers to entry and attract an eligible 
bidder to win against the incumbent. It would be, however, unjustified to state that barriers to 
entry and government’s lack of commitment decided alone about the fiasco of competitive 
tendering in other regions. Although they were probably decisive, there were certainly other 
reasons. In many cases regional authorities could be reluctant toward tenders for different 
motives (other than presented above). In many cases cosy relationship with incumbent or 
lack of awareness could play role. Given the historical perspective of declining traffic in 
Poland, market trends could discourage potential entrants. 
 
Nevertheless, tenders have typically attracted only incumbent’s bid that was then subject to 
negotiations. The outcome of the reform has been thus sole source negotiations and not the 
highly desirable competitive tendering. 
 
4. Regional authorities’ relations with the incumbent and setting up local operators 
 
Failure of competitive tendering in Poland made regions suffer the financial consequences of 
incumbent’s inefficiency. Firstly, PKP PR tried to improve its financial performance by 
reducing output. Failure to fulfil contracts became a recurrent problem. Moreover, the 
financial crisis prompted the incumbent to opportunistic behaviour towards regional 
authorities which were dependent on him. The company not only engaged in renegotiating 
old contracts, but also started to raise the price of services at the contract renewals5. On 
several occasions, when potential newcomers appeared interested, PKP PR reduced its own 
offer significantly. Otherwise the company threatened to walk away from negotiations and 
discontinue services. 
 
The incumbent’s opportunistic behaviour affected inhabitants but the company became more 
interested in subsidies than passengers. The problem of organisational culture, signalised in 
Section 2, played here probably an important role. The company lacked long-term 
commitment to provide citizens with a durable public transport. 
 
                                               
5 E.g. PKP PR demanded PLN 34 million in 2005, PLN 39.6 million in 2006 and PLN 48.8 million in 2007 for the 
same number of train-km in Kujawy-Pomerania. The average inflation rate in Poland in 2005-2007 was 1.8%. 
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Instead, due to the government’s failure to act, PKP PR had an important short-term internal 
objective – to keep afloat. The company focused on it and the result has been the increasing 
discrepancy between the operations and received subsidies (Table 1). At the expense of 
regional authorities the incumbent managed to improve its financial situation and even to 
regain financial balance temporarily (2007). On the other hand, it has also prompted the most 
prosperous regions to counteract the opportunistic behaviour by setting up their own 
operators. 
 
Table 1. Operations (millions of train-km) and subsidies received (millions of PLN) by 
the incumbent (PKP PR / PR) in 2003-2014 
Year ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 
Operations 93 88 72 71 64 65 63 62 62 56 48 44 
Subsidies 246 420 385 492 545 559 674 810 930 921 780 788 
(Zajfert, 2016); cumulated inflation 2003-2014: 33.2% 
 
Interestingly, the compulsory devolution of the PKP PR (renamed hence to PR) in 2008 did 
not change too much in this regard. Sixteen regional authorities were given against their will 
the company which they considered to be hostile. Only six regions had a share higher than 
6% and the ownership was far too dispersed to have a real control over company’s actions. 
Plus, due to demographic, socio-economic and spatial differences among individual regions, 
they did not have a sense of common interest in the company. Business oversight reasons 
added to the picture, including persisting lack of transparency and flawed system of 
subsidies settlement. Moreover, although PR was keeping afloat again, it still needed 
restructuring and massive investments. 
 
Therefore, regions became business partners not only without a real control over the 
company, but also without a real motivation to gain it. By the incumbent’s devolution, the 
government was trying to shift the remaining risk in the regional rail sector away to the 
regional authorities. However, instead of underwriting this risk, regional authorities chose not 
to commit. 
 
All in all, the only observable immediate result of the incumbent’s devolution was that regions 
could now avoid the inutile procedure of tenders for nothing and award contracts directly to 
the company they technically co-owned. Many of them did, but length of contracts remained 
low. However, the most prosperous regions kept establishing their own operators. 
 
They have followed the example of the wealthiest Mazovia that already in 2004 had set up 
Koleje Mazowieckie (literally Mazovian Railways) to award this operator long-term contracts 
for the all rail public services in the region. Local operators have been set up so far by Lower 
Silesia (Koleje Dolnośląskie, operating since 2008), Silesia (Koleje Śląskie, 2011), 
Wielkopolska (Koleje Wielkopolskie, 2011), Małopolska (Koleje Małopolskie, 2014) and Łódź 
Region (Łódzka Kolej Aglomeracyjna, 2014) and awarded long-term contracts (typically for 
10-15 years, after a shorter initial contract). 
 
The local operators are monopolistic and due to limited area of operations they can not 
benefit from the significant economies of scale. Their services are thus not necessarily less 
expensive for regions than incumbent’s ones. Sometimes, they are even more expensive 
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(Table 2). However, regions are evidently ready to pay high premiums for mitigating 
uncertainty in providing public services to their inhabitants. This is discussed in Section 5. 
 
Table 2. Average unitary subsidies for different operators in Poland in 2009-2014 
(PLN/train-km) 
Year ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 
PR 10.72 13.05 14.93 16.57 16.37 17.98 
KM 12.50 12.76 13.49 14.18 16.00 17.33 
KD 18.44 17.98 20.36 20.09 21.66 21.92 
KŚ x x 12.26 13.83 16.60 22.38 
(Zajfert, 2016); KM – Koleje Mazowieckie, KD – Koleje Dolnośląskie, KŚ – Koleje Śląskie 
 
The government has apparently recognised that it had not succeed to transfer the whole risk 
in the regional rail sector to the regions. Hence, it stepped in and took the controlling interest 
in the incumbent in 2015. Finally, its restructuring started. Characteristically, to secure its 
financial stability, the government has exerted pressure on the regional authorities to sign 
longer-term contracts with the company (usually for 5 years). Many of them obeyed. 
 
Table 3 shows the market shares of the companies that are active in Poland. Mazovia and 
Silesia use exclusively their own local operators. Lower Silesia, Małopolska, Wielkopolska 
and Łódź Region share their contracts between their local railways and PR. The market 
share of the incumbent is, however, drooping there from one year to another. Yet, on several 
occasions, the incumbent has been used there as a last resort provider. Kujawy-Pomerania 
cooperate with both PR and Arriva. The other regions use exclusively the incumbent. 
 
Table 3. Market shares of the operators active on the market of regional rail services in 
Poland in 2015 
Operator PR KM KŚ KW KD Arriva KMŁ ŁKA 
% of passengers 43.59 35.87 9.01 4.18 2.95 2.43 1.01 0.92 
% of passenger-km 53.63 27.21 7.64 4.28 3.87 2.10 0.34 0.89 
Calculated from (UTK, 2016); KM – Koleje Mazowieckie, KŚ – Koleje Śląskie, KW – Koleje 
Wielkopolskie, KD – Koleje Dolnośląskie, KMŁ – Koleje Małopolskie, ŁKA – Łódzka Kolej 
Aglomeracyjna 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Setting up internal operators rather than contracting the public services to external suppliers 
can be referred to as vertical integration. We believe that there are at least two theoretical 
reasons providing possible explanations of this phenomenon in rail sector in Poland. 
 
The more obvious possible explanation would be integration to eliminate market power. 
Competitive tendering failed in Poland. Regions responsible for subsidising public services 
found themselves at the mercy of the incumbent using monopolistic practices. Hence, they 
have created their own suppliers as the perceived benefits outweighed the perceived cost. 
 
Another explanation, not necessarily excluding the prior, involves integration to lower 
transaction cost. When such costs are high, opportunistic behaviour – thus taking advantage 
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of a transaction partner when allowed (or triggered) by circumstances – is more likely to 
occur. Contracts in which transaction costs are high enough to make vertical integration 
desirable may involve specialised assets, uncertainty that makes monitoring difficult or 
information that needs to be developed (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). Opportunities for 
exploitation are even greater when one contract party is dependent on another. This 
occurred in Poland when due to competitive tendering failure it became unrealistic for 
regions to switch provider. 
 
Specialised assets involved in delivering a contract are enough to make vertical integration a 
considered option when it is impossible to switch suppliers in the short run (Carlton and 
Perloff, 2005). As regions in Poland found themselves locked in with PKP PR with uncertain 
time horizon, the use of the specialised assets (rolling stock together with maintenance 
facilities) provided great incentive to integrate. 
 
Partial or quasi-vertical integration, involving only a specific physical asset and not the entire 
supplying company, may be enough to avoid opportunistic behaviour (Carlton and Perloff, 
2005). In fact, when public authorities engage in rolling stock investment, which is common in 
Europe including Poland, they quasi-vertically integrate. Their motivation may be to benefit 
from competition through setting barriers to entry low, but at the same time they prohibit 
incumbent’s opportunistic behaviour. 
 
However, in the analysed situation in Poland, quasi-vertical integration could not solve the 
problem of being exposed to the risk (or rather uncertainty) of remaining with the incumbent if 
a competitive tender went wrong despite having made rolling stock available to bidders. For 
the set of reasons shown in Section 3, tendering seemed extremely risky both to would-be 
bidders and organisers. Hence, the regions able to afford crucial assets may have decided 
that spending some more money to establish their own operator is worth removing 
completely the uncertainty of remaining with the incumbent6. 
 
Moreover, there have been many other reasons in Poland to fully integrate that are related to 
transaction costs. With vertical integration costs of negotiation and renegotiation of contracts, 
costs of designing and organising tenders and costs of contract enforcing became inexistent. 
Furthermore, business oversight and contract delivery monitoring has been made possible 
and easy as the internal operator is now fully transparent. Thus, regional authorities possess 
finally detailed and trustworthy information about costs and demand – crucial when 
organising public service. The responsiveness of such operator to the regions’ needs is also 
much more expanded compared to the cooperation with the co-owned incumbent. E.g. it is 
much easier to penalise the company’s management when the ownership is not dispersed – 
but another circumstance seems to be more important here. 
 
Both contract parties have the same long-term objective now: to provide inhabitants with a 
strong public transport. This is an important factor of a good-working, trusting relationship 
that allows business partners to keep long-run transaction costs low. 
                                               
6 Note that the uncertainty of remaining with the incumbent can also be analysed in terms of integration to 
eliminate market power, as well as in terms of integration to assure supply which is another theoretical motive for 
vertical integration. Service disruptions have been intermittently painful in Poland, so it could also play a role. 
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It does not mean that the solution that regions in Poland have found is perfect – far from it. 
The national de facto monopoly has been replaced by many subnational de facto 
monopolies, thus “the Polish model” can not be successful on the cost side. Especially, it can 
not be that successful in this regard as it possibly would be if a working competition occurred 
on the market. Yet, after setting up internal operators and awarding them 10-15-year 
contracts, opportunities to introduce a “working competition” in Poland are probably much 
lower than before – as more than half of the market (in terms of passengers) has been 
closed for the external entrants. Thus, technically, the wealthiest regions have traded-off the 
possible efficiency gains in the future for more substantial tranquillity today. 
 
However, protection from uncertainty or risk can only be done at a price. It has long been 
recognised in the literature that one of the key issues in contracting out of rail services is risk 
allocation. Therefore, it should be a deeply considered element of regulatory design. Yet, the 
distribution of risks that we can observe in Poland does not belong to the rules of the game 
designed by a state as regulator. It is rather a result of the game that regions decided to play. 
 
Moreover, while costs have not decreased, the quality of services have improved 
substantially due to commitment and a different business culture of local operators. Also, 
regions seem to be more eager to increase subsidies and invest in the new rolling stock 
when it is used by their own companies.  
 
Total subsidisation by regions keeps increasing in Poland. However, this is no longer due to 
incumbent’s exploitation. Rather, it is the effect of regions’ efforts to restore and develop 
railway services after the years of neglect and shrinkage. Expansion of services not only 
saved further lines from closures, but also made possible to restore traffic on previously 
closed lines which is observable in Lower Silesia, Mazovia and elsewhere. 
 
More services, new rolling stock and better quality of the offer are important factors attracting 
passengers to rail. That not only allows for more revenues to cover costs but also may result 
in more favourable modal split. The entire growth in patronage observable recently in Poland 
can be attributed to the activities of the local operators. 
 
All in all, by setting up their own (internal) local operators regional authorities in Poland have 
managed to implement stronger public transport in weak institutional framework. They have 
been more successful in managing change in the regional rail sector than the government. 
Ironically, an important consideration becomes how they can prepare for the EU’s 4th railway 
package which will, some day, introduce a compulsory competitive tendering once again. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. The Polish railway market in 2000, 2004, 2010 and 2016 
Segment of market 2000 
(under Act of 1997) 
2004 
(under Act of 2003) 
2010 
(under Act of 2003) 
2016 
(under Act of 2003) 
 
Passenger regional services (PSO) 
 
Incumbent (PKP) has 
monopolistic position (receives 
subsidies from the state 
budget).  
 
Regions subsidise services, 
competitive tendering only on 
paper; in practice, sole source 
negotiations with incumbent 
(PKP PR) are a typical form of 
contracting. 
 
PKP PR devolved to regions 
and renamed to PR. Direct 
awarding is a typical form of 
contracting. Two regions 
(Mazovia, Silesia) set up local 
operators. 
 
More regions established local 
operators. Government took 
interests in the sinking 
incumbent. 
 
Passenger inter-regional services (PSO) 
 
Incumbent (PKP) has 
monopolistic position (receives 
subsidies from the state 
budget). 
 
Incumbent (PKP PR) has 
monopolistic position (receives 
subsidies from the state 
budget). 
 
PKP IC receives exclusive 
subsides from a governmental 
PSO scheme. PR challenged 
PKP IC by offering commercial 
services on the same 
destinations (some of them 
received subsidies from 
regions). 
 
PKP IC receives exclusive 
subsides from a governmental 
PSO scheme. PR only 
remained on one destination 
(Warsaw – Łódź) subsidised by 
Łódz Region. 
 
Passenger inter-regional services (commercial) 
 
Incumbent (PKP) has 
monopolistic position (open 
access possible in theory but 
there are no newcomers). 
 
Incumbent (PKP IC) has 
monopolistic position (no 
newcomers). 
 
Fierce open access competition 
between government-owned 
PKP IC and regions-owned PR; 
market share of non-incumbent 
operator (PR) reached 33% in 
volume (all inter-regional 
services). 
 
PKP IC forced PR out of the 
market (2015) by the strategic 
use of the political process. 
Strategic lapses of the 
newcomer contributed largely to 
its failure. External operators 
about to enter the market in the 
nearest future. 
 
Freight services 
 
Open access, but lines in 
possession of vertically 
integrated incumbent (PKP); no 
regulatory body; 21 
concessions awarded but 
activities of new operators 
generally limited to services 
provided via former industrial 
infrastructure. 
 
Competition becomes visible 
but has purely regional nature: 
market share of non-incumbent 
operators reaches 42% in 
volume while only 8% in 
performance. 
 
40 operators, fierce competition; 
market share of non-incumbent 
operators reaches 55% in 
volume and 30% in 
performance; the entire pre-
crisis market growth since 2002 
can be attributed to the 
activities of newcomers.    
 
Mature market with successfully 
restructured incumbent operator 
PKP Cargo (IPO in 2013), PKP 
Group has only 33% stake in 
PKP Cargo; market shares of 
non-incumbent operators close 
to 50% in performance. 
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